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Access to external nance for small and medium enterprises is vital for survival
and growth of such rms. In this paper we have analyzed the determinants of access
to credit in microenterprises of Turkey. We use a unique dataset covering a large
sample of microenterprises. We nd that size and signals of wealth positively aect
the likelihood of getting a formal credit.
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Small rms present unique challenges for capital markets. They have high birth and
mortality rates. Determining which rms could have the potential for growth and hence
the ability to repay loans is dicult. Enterprise owners often have few assets that can be
used for collateral (De Soto, 1989) [9].
In spite of these diculties, the small and medium enterprises (SME) in developed
market economies frequently have access to bank credit. For example, among a sample
of rms with fewer than ve workers operating in United States, half reported having a
current bank loan (Woodru, 2001) [11]. As a percentage of total bank loans, SME have
enjoyed 47 percent in United States, 50 percent in Japan, 47 percent in South Korea,
39 percent in France, 27 percent in Germany, and 15 percent in India. Formal credit is
much less common among the SME in developing countries. In Turkey, the corresponding
gure has been less than 10 percent of all bank lending (OECD 2002) [8]. The picture for
the microenterprises is even bleaker. Fewer than 3 percent of the small rms surveyed in
2000 say that they have ever had a bank loan.
Economists have examined the link between access to capital and the foundation and
performance of rms from many angles. As we will see, much of the literature focuses on
the role of the formal nancial system in channeling capital to rms which have generally
greater size and stability than microenterprises. Although a more important source of
nance for microenterprises, informal lending has seldom been examined by researchers.
On the other hand loans obtained from specic microenterprise loan programs have been
the subject of much research (see Morduch, 1999, for a review) [7].
The latter can be considered as semi-formal. Even if the up-to-date evidence does
not uniformly point out that micronance can provide Pareto ecient outcomes, there is
considerable consensus that it can expand the opportunity set of the self-employed and
asset-poor people and somewhat improve their earnings.
Related studies of microenterprises have focused on the labor market segmentation
hypothesis on the source of external credit for start-up or ongoing business purposes
(Heikko and Pagan, 2001; Woodru, 2001) [4], [11], and on the link between non-convex
returns to capital and poverty traps (McKenzie and Woodru). One of the most rel-
evant studies is by McKernan (2002) [6], who estimates the eect of the microcredit
participation on earnings in rural Bangladesh. McKernan nds signicant participation
eects after carefully controlling for unobserved characteristics thanks to a control group
from those villages that were not targeted by the microcredit programs. Another study
by Trillo et. al. (2002) shows that various credit sources have dierent eects on the
technical eciency among microenterprises in Mexico. Trillo et. al (2002) observes that
the microenterprises that had used bank loans to start up would be the most ecient in
technical terms. Brown et. al. (2004) [2] nds that access to external formal credit in a
sample of 297 small rms in Romania increases the growth of both employment and sales.
This paper diers from these studies in several respects. First, this is the rst paper
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microenterprise sector in Turkey. We nd that signals re
ecting the wealth levels are very
important in terms of in
uencing the likelihood of formal credit in contrast to informal
credit.
2 Literature Review
In the absence of wealth and credit constraints, all agents and rms would invest so as
to equate marginal cost of capital, which should be equal for all the agents, to marginal
benet. If there were no credit constraints, greater access to a substitute for credit such
as current cash 
ow, parental wealth or community wealth would be irrelevant for invest-
ment decisions. However, empirical ndings do not conrm this expectation.
James J. Tybout (1983) [10], in an early attempt to document the evidence on credit
constraints in a developing country framework, nds signicant binding credit constraints
for small Colombian rms. Small rms generally have to wait for positive income shocks
to accumulate suciently to be able to nance investment. Although the eect of credit
constraints on larger rms is smaller, they exist nevertheless.
Banerjee and Du
o (2004) [1] analyzes whether Indian rms are credit constrained by
looking at the way they react to changes in directed lending programs. Their argument is
that credit constrained rms will use the extended credit availability to expand production
whereas the unconstrained rms may use it as a substitute for other borrowing (because
the directed credit may be cheaper than other sources of credit and unconstrained rms
should already be at their optimal investment demand curve). They nd that the new
credit was used extensively to nance more production. They infer this from the signif-
icant acceleration in the growth rate of sales and prots. Therefore, they conclude that
many of the rms must have been severely credit constrained. From their econometric
analysis, they estimate that an increase of Rs. 1000 in lending causes 3.09 percent in-
crease in prot. At the mean prot (which was Rs. 43,000), this would correspond to an
increase of Rs. 1,360. The impact on prot of a Rs. 1,000 increase in loans is much higher
than the cost of capital, which conrms that the rms were credit constrained. More-
over, they argue that the impact is too big to be explained as the subsidy impact of loans.
Hernandez-Trillo, Pagan and Paxton (2002) show that microenterprises in Mexico
utilizing bank loans, carryover business capital, and credit from clients and suppliers, are
more technically ecient than those relying on family, friends and own nancial sources.
They nd that bank loans lead to the highest degree of technical eciency. Banks tend
to oer the largest average loan size with the longest terms, which are signicant factors
in allowing microentrepreneurs to overcome capital constraints.
Japelli (1990) [5] reports that 19 percent of US families had their request for credit
rejected by a nancial institution; the assets of these constrained families were 63 per-
cent lower than the unconstrained families. \Discouraged borrowers" (those who did not
apply for a loan because they expected to be rejected) had even lower wealth than the
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reports that rms that had been in existence for less than four years complained that on
average only 50 percent of their loan request was met. The ndings suggest that new
businesses are more likely to be credit constrained and the personal assets of the business
owners limit the capital available for investment. Indeed, Ando (1985) argues that as
high as 80 percent of the loans had required either personal or business collateral.
Zeller (1994) [12] shows that in Madagascar, both the informal moneylenders and
community-based group lenders ration loan demands according to the total household
wealth and the leverage of the household, which is the ratio of outstanding debt over
income. Formal credit, on the other hand, is rationed extensively based on a collaterable
asset, most often the land possessed by the household.
Average interest rates to be paid by the poorest one-third of the households to the
informal lenders is 103.6 percent but to the formal lenders only 17.2 percent. However, the
access of the poorer households to the formal credit is limited. The wealthy households
could obtain 72.9 percent of the credit from formal lenders, but only 41.6 percent of the
credit borrowed by the poorest one-third of the households could be obtained from formal
sources. McMillan and Woodru (1999) nd that out of 259 rms they have surveyed
in Mexico, only 10 percent reported that the start-up capital was obtained by a bank
loan. Moreover, for ongoing business, trade credit (a type of informal credit) is much
more common. The rms report that 57 percent of ongoing customer relationships and
53 percent of ongoing supplier relationships involve trade credit, whereas the only 22
percent of the rms have received a bank credit.
3 Credit Markets in Turkey
In Turkey, the likelihood of experiencing wealth and credit constraints for the self-
employed and employer in the informal sector is plausibly high. The share of small
and medium enterprises (formal and informal SMEs) in formal banking sector credit has
never exceeded 4 percent. In contrast, the SMEs in industry share around 61.1 percent
of total employment in manufacturing. Moreover the small rms employing less than 10
workers constitute 95 percent of all establishments in the economy in number (OECD,
2002).
An additional factor that might aggravate the capitals constraints of the informal sec-
tor participants is that they scarcely have collateral to post up in order to access credit.
The major sources of formal credit for the `informal rms' are Halkbank (literally People's
Bank established to extend credit to small businesses but apparently loans most of its
funds to the large companies), credit guarantee cooperatives and business associations.
All of these sources consistently ask for collateral and sound business plans. The nominal
interest rate is predetermined and applies to everybody qualied to take a credit. The
loans are usually long-term, to be paid back in one or more years. The loan rate in 2000
was on average 85 percent a year, with an in
ation of 78 percent. As of now, December
2005 the average annual rate of interest was down to 15 percent and the in
ation is down
5to 11 percent.
In 2000, the most favorable loan was for the purpose of \building new capacity" for
a term of 2-5 years with an annual rate of 90 percent. The least favorable loan was
short-term loan for \working capital purposes" at a rate of 85 percent for a 1-3 months
term. The limit for both types of loans was 5 billion TL, approximately 8000 US dollars
at 2000 prices. As of December 2005 the maximum limit is 20,000 US dollars and the
average annual rate of interest for all types of loans is just 15 percent. The term structure
has also improved; it ranges from 1 year at minimum to 5 years.
There is no particular nancial institution established for the purpose of giving nan-
cial support to SMEs. However Halkbank bears this function at the present time. Loans
are made available at somewhat lower interest rates than the market rate by the bank
to small traders and craftsmen mainly through Small Traders' and Craftsmen's Security
Cooperatives. Craftsmen are eligible for working capital and investment credit from this
program. Depending on the size of the rm, the limits and terms of the credit vary.
A guarantee liability fund with the Halkbank constitutes the provision of guarantees
issued by the Credit Guarantee Fund. The Credit Guarantee Fund Company (KGF A.S.)
is a non-prot organization and it adds its income to the guarantee liability fund. The
Credit Guarantee Fund provides a guarantee for 70 or 80 percent of the loan, depending
on the size of the loan made by Halkbank to craftsmen, tradesmen and SMEs. These
loans include cash loans such as working capital credits, investment and export credits
and non-cash loans in the form of bank guarantee letters or letters of credit. However,
the scope of the Fund is severely limited. Between 1994 and 2001, the Fund provided
guarantees and loans in only 988 cases involving 606 enterprises (OECD, 2002: 204) [8].
Usually the credit constrained and rationed borrower asks for a loan from `relatives
and friends'. The lending would be short-term and in either dollar or euro currencies.
The remaining desperate credit seekers then have to nd the moneylender. The cost
of the loan taken from the moneylender is expectedly the highest: interest charged on
foreign exchange denominated principal (Ozar 1998).
3.1 Credit Sources for Microenterprises
The data for the empirical investigation are from the 2000 \Urban Areas Small and Un-
incorporated Enterprise Survey" that was collected by the State Institute of Statistics
in Turkey in the rst three quarters of 2000. The survey covers 20,000 microenterprises,
dened as rms of less than ten individuals, and was carried out in four major metropoli-
tan cities. Out of those 20,000, 6371 have been specied as informal units, dened as
unincorporated microenterprises (individual ownership or ordinary partnership) engaged
in urban non-agricultural economic activities and paying lump sum tax or not paying
any tax at all. The survey examines reasons for becoming self-employed in the sector,
sub sectors, incomes, capital structures, costs, enterprise problems, credit need, migrant
status, social security coverage and employment patterns, inter alias.
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Banks Want collateral 44.5
Ocial Procedures are intensive 29
Interest rates are too high 25
Table 2: Main Use of Credit
Use Formal Credit Users Informal Credit Users
Purchasing raw materials and Supplies 60 44
Maintaining and Purchasing Business equipment 29.9 34.1
Reapayment of Debt 14.81 21.3
The main variables of the dataset and the descriptive statistics are shown in the Ap-
pendix. The basic unit of analysis as mentioned above is an informal rm dened as \a
rm engaging [in] urban non-agricultural economic activities, legally specied as a simple
partnership or sole proprietorship, employing less than ten workers (waged or unwaged)
and either paying its taxes on a voluntary basis through simple taxation method or does
not pay any taxes at all". This denition is consistent with the commonly accepted ILO
denition of informal sector enterprises.
The Table 1 below, gives some information on why borrowing has been a rare rather
than a common activity. Almost half of the microenterprises claim that the collateral
asked by the formal credit institutions is the main obstacle to borrowing. Interestingly
the cost of formal credit is prohibitive for only 25 percent, implying that compared to
other credit sources formal credit might be cheaper.
Table 2 below, illustrates the uses to which loans are put: the loans are generally used
for productive purposes. Only 15 percent of the informal credit users and 21 percent of
the formal credit users have directed the loans obtained to repayment of previous debts.
On the other hand, a high percentage of the loans is used for working capital purposes.
Table 3 below, summarizes the subjective evaluations of the existing problems related
to the economic activity. As is apparent, the major obstacle is the lack of capital, be it
for investment or for working capital requirements. Two thirds of the microenterprises
in Turkey suer from the lack of and the cost of capital to nance investment.
In any case, these tables are suciently clear to motivate our focus on the importance
and the extent of the credit constraints in our sample.
7Table 3: Problems Aecting the Economic Activity
Problems Always Sometimes Never
Lack of Investment Capital 41 27 32
Lack of Working Capital 43 29 28
Lack or high cost of
nancial services 34 27 39
High Taxes 38 25 37
Table 4: Sources of Finance for Microenterprises (%)
Start-Up Capital All Firms Firms Employing Workers
Formal Loan 1.43 2.07
Informal Loan 25.71 30.08
Credit within last year
Formal loan 6.32 9.72
Informal loan 10.07 23.37
4 Econometric Analysis
4.1 Determinants of External Credit
Table 4 shows the sources of external nance provided at startup and within the 12
months of economic activity previous to the survey. Access to formal bank loans at the
start up is very rare. Only 1.43 percent of all rms and 2.07 percent of the rms em-
ploying workers received a bank loan at start-up. Given the signicance of lack of capital
as a major problem cited by the entrepreneurs we can comfortably consider that either
borrowing is very costly or most of the potential borrowers are rationed out.
The explanatory variables that are included in both multinomial logit and the earn-
ings equations are as follows: Years of Education of the Owner, Age of the Owner, Age
Square of the Owner, Firm Life, and sector dummy variables1. Years of Education of the
Owner is a coded variable derived from the question that asks the educational status of
the respondent. We use the conventional coding system used in various studies (Heck-
man, 2000) [3]. We expect a positive and signicant eect of a higher education on the
likelihood of obtaining formal credit in comparison to not getting any credit or getting
informal credit. One obvious reason is that the more able and educated entrepreneurs
can utilize the borrowed funds better. Secondly, bank ocials may nd it easier to deal
with the highly educated borrowers.
Age of the Owner is a variable indicating the age of the entrepreneur at the time of
the survey completion. This variable is used as a proxy for experience which may enhance
the productivity of the entrepreneurial activity through `learning by doing' or `network
connections' built through time. The Age Square variable is used to check whether there
exists a nonlinearity with respect to age. A priori we expect a positive and signicant
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credit due to the `dense' networks the entrepreneurs may have developed through time.
On the other hand, age with the life of the rm may signal `stability' and `visibility' in
the eyes of formal creditors. If this later eect dominates, we expect a higher probability
of obtaining formal credit as the age of the entrepreneur increases.
The additional explanatory variables used only in the multinomial logit equation are
Social Security Coverage, Bank Capital, and Size of the Household of the Owner. Social
Security Coverage is a dummy variable derived from the answers to the question: \Are
you covered by any social security institution?" We assign zero to the answer `not reg-
istered' and 1 to the other options2. We motivate the usage of the rst as follows. In
order to be covered by Social Security, entrepreneurs at least have to report their regular
incomes and register with the relevant social security institution. Regular contributions
can be observed and reported to the nancial intermediary if needed. That aspect is
rather in lieu of our model's requirement of observance of the income generated.
Social Security Coverage is expected to have a positive and signicant eect on the
likelihood of securing formal credit. However, as our model indicated, being formal, or
in our case having incurred the xed costs to be covered by a social security institution,
does not mean that every `formal' rm will borrow from formal credit sources. Some may
still voluntarily opt not to borrow.
Having obtained a start-up loan from a bank is an important signal in terms of
both availability of collateral and being formal in the past. This is a dummy variable
constructed by assigning 1 if the answer to the question \How did you get the money
to start/join the business?" is `Bank Credit'. We obviously expect a positive and a sig-
nicant coecient for this variable in terms of its eect on the access to the formal credit.
Size of the Household is derived from the answer to the question \How many people
are there in the house except you?" Size of the household, is expected to be correlated
with the social links to the relatives and friends who could be used as informal lenders.
Thus, expected result from the mlogit regression will be a positive and signicant coe-
cient for the informal credit choice.
Space is a dummy variable indicating whether the location of the work place is a
`regular establishment' (i.e. shop, workshop or oce). We argue that a standard and
visible work place will enhance the probability of obtaining formal and informal credit as
well as contributing positively to the monthly net earnings.
Firm Life is a variable constructed by subtracting the year in which the establish-
ment was initiated from the year 2000, in which the survey was carried out. A priori
a longer rm life implies `stability' and hence a higher chance of obtaining formal or
informal credit. However, it may also mean more accumulated savings and considering
that self-nancing is preferable, higher savings may imply less demand for credit.
Number of Workers has a very one-sided frequency distribution since almost 60 per-
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Whole Sample Sample With Cut-o
Informal Formal Informal Formal
Age of the Owner 0.03 0.06 0.16 0.64
Age of the Owner Square -0.0006 -0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0009
Years of Education -0.03 0.046** -0.049** 0.025
Social Security Coverage -0.29* 0.96*** -0.29* 0.91***
Firm Life -0.01 0.026*** -0.16 0.023**
Space -1.03*** -0.87*** 0.71* 0.27
Number of Workers 1.24*** 1.15*** 1.13*** 1.02***
Daily Working Hours 0.03 -0.002 0.065*** 0.038
Bank Capital 0.65 2.33*** 0.44 2.64***
Female -0.16 0.14 0.47 0.21
Size of the Household -0.13*** -0.06* -0.17*** -0.010***
Constant -1.42** -4.36*** -3.49*** -6.25***
For column (1) N: 5844, LR chi2 = 358:73, Prob > chi2 > 0:00; for column (2) N:4318,
LR chi2 = 1851:51;Prob > chi2 = 0:000 * Signicant at 10% level. ** Signicant at
5% level. *** Signicant at 1% level, Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Note:
The dependent variable is rm's choice of credit: Sectoral dummies included but the
coecients are not reported.
cent of the establishments are self-employment businesses. We argue that `employment
relation' will be a major factor for both the earnings and the credit estimations.
Daily Working Hours is a variable corresponding to the answer to the question \What
are your average working hours per day in your activity?" Working hours may signal the
demand conditions. Higher working hours indicate more demand and higher sales, which
may signal an opportunity to post collateral. On the other, higher working hours may
also mean a substitution for labor-intensive techniques given the lack of adequate capi-
tal. Then the expected signs on the eect of working hours on credit access may be the
opposite.
Female is the gender variable. Since the most of the entrepreneurs (more than 80
percent) are men we have preferred not to split the sample into two gender groups,
but instead used a female dummy variable to estimate the eect of gender in the whole
sample. Given the cultural background of informal participants we expect a priori a
negative correlation between being female and obtaining any form of credit.
104.2 Regression
4.2.1 Specication for the Whole Sample
The identication variables (Social Security Coverage, Size of the Household and Bank
Capital) all have signicant eects on the probability of borrowing from informal and for-
mal credit markets (Table 5, Column I). As expected social security coverage (a signal of
formality) increases the likelihood of having a formal credit and decreases the likelihood
of having an informal credit as compared to not to have any loans from any sources. Size
of the Household decreases the probability of borrowing from either source, formal and
informal. Our interpretation is that this variable implicitly counts for the availability of
`unpaid family labor' hence a cheap substitute for capital and/or the potential availabil-
ity of `self-nance' through family sources. Bank Capital has no statistically signicant
eect on the likelihood of borrowing from informal lenders but increases the probability
of obtaining a formal credit.
4.2.2 Specication for the Sample with Cut-o Point
The group that contains the entrepreneurs is the largest one. It is very heterogeneous;
some have high human and physical capital and earn substantial prots whereas others
barely survive with minimal human and physical capital. In order to exclude the asset-
poor with a very low likelihood of ability to choose to borrow or to self-nance we divide
the sample in two: the rms with higher investment than median capital stock (greater
than $258) and the rms with lower. That is, 2390 rms are dropped. Then we use
same econometric technique rst to obtain the inverse Mills ratios for each group and
estimate the coecients of the explanatory variables on log monthly prot controlling for
endogenous selection.
The column (II) of Table 5 shows the results of the m-logit regression with the me-
dian capital stock as the cut-o point to split o the group of rms with no credit at
all. Some of the results dier from the regression results of the whole sample. Space
seems to be positively and signicantly associated with the probability of obtaining in-
formal credit. However, this variable loses its signicance for the likelihood of having
formal credit. This may suggest that informal moneylenders still assess a durable work-
ing space as credible ex-post collateral to be appropriated. The coecients on Daily
Working Hours turn out to be positive and signicant. This is in line with the conven-
tional assumption that higher output and prot expectations may imply higher working
hours, and the creditors, formal and informal, simply pick the potentially protable rms.
5 Conclusion
Although the importance of micro enterprises for economic growth, employment growth
and poverty reduction is widely recognized for the developing countries, there has been
little empirical, policy-relevant research into the determinants of choice of organizational
form and of access to external credit in the micro enterprise sector. Access to external
11nance, either in terms of start-up capital or in terms of a loan, is very limited for the
micro-enterprises in Turkey. The rms are heterogeneous; some show signs of dynamic
growth and others seem to be doomed for bare survival.
Controlling for rm, entrepreneur and sector characteristics we nd that being formal
implies higher access to the formal credit market. In turn, formal credit enhances higher
average capital productivity in terms of higher monetary returns in comparison to the
informal credit borrowers. In short we nd that informal and formal small rms are struc-
turally dierent. Although the small rm segment is dominated by informal enterprises,
formal rms of very small size exist and their characteristics and the environment they
operate in are not the same .
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13APPENDIX
14Definitions of Main Variables
Variable Description
Profit  Net revenue after deducting all business expenses in the latest month of 
activity
Investment Capital  Total amount of purchases for investment purposes within last 12 
months
Size Number of workers including the owner of the enterprise
Firm Life The years in which the business has been active
Household Income Average net income of the household from all sources per month 
Age Owner’s age at the time of the survey
Years of Education Assigned years for graduation of primary, secondary, high school, and 
college (0, if illiterate) 
Marital Status 1, if married
Gender 1, if male
Daily Hours Average hours worked within last month
Days of Activity Average number of days actively engaged in the business
Migration  1, if the owner has migrated to the city
Space 1, if the business has a regular establishment (shop, office or a 
workshop)
Size of Household The number of household members who share the household income
Stay 1, if the owner plans to continue the business for the coming five years
Inheritance 1, if the business was inherited
Involuntary 1, if the owner could not find other work or family needed additional 
income 
Bank Start-up Loan 1, if the start-up was financed by a bank loan
Social Security Coverage 1, if the owner is covered by any of the current social security 
institutions
Industry 1, if the business is in textiles, other manufacturing, transportation, 
communication or storage, construction
Trade 1, if engaged in trading activities
Services 1, if engaged in various services



































































Male (%) 93.25 % 94.41% 93.47 %
Social Security (%) 91.43 69.74 72.62
Involuntarily in the 
Informal Sector (%)
34.03 39.97 41.10
Planning to Exit (%) 14.55 19.08 11.03
Industry (%) 17.92 19.90 16.77
Living in the City Since 
Birth (%)
78.44 70.23 74.22
Initially Used Bank 
Loans to Start-up (%)
10.13 1.15 0.81
16